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Abstract
This paper aims at empirically investigating the role of moral hazard in the
e¢ ctivity of deposit insurance in achieving banking stability. If the negative
e¤ect of deposit insurance on banking stability is through moral hazard, then
deposit insurance will be associated with banking insolvency and credit crunch
more than with bank runs. To test this hypothesis, we compute measures of
these two types of banking instability. We nd that deposit insurance per se
has no signicant e¤ect either on bank insolvency and credit crunch or on bank
runs. However, when the deposit insurance is coupled with an increase in credit
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cant e¤ect on bank insolvency and
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1 Introduction
Deposit insurance has become increasingly popular in recent years with a large num-
ber of countries adopting the scheme in their regulatory framework for banking sys-
tem stability. The number of countries with deposit insurance has risen from an
estimated nine at the end of the 1960s to about 22 in 1984 and around 88 by 2003
(Demirgüç-Kunt, Karakaovali and Laeven, 2005). Underlining its widespread accep-
tance, deposit insurance became a standard for the single banking market of the
European Union in 1994 (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002) and more recently,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) endorsed a limited form of the scheme in
its code of best practices while the World Bank has been recommending it to sev-
eral countries (see Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and Laeven, 2008; Folkerts-Landau and
Lindgren, 1998).
Countries adopting deposit insurance aim at minimising the risk of banking crises
arising from self-fullling expectations1. The seminal paper of Diamond and Dyb-
vig (1983) supported by several subsequent studies (see, for example Hazlett, 1997;
Chang and Velasco, 2001; Green and Lin, 2003; Andolfatto, Nosal and Wallace, 2006)
rationalises the adoption of deposit insurance as a way of ensuring banking stability.
The paper demonstrates that in a fractional reserve banking system, full deposit
insurance is able to rule out bank runs, which are self-fullling prophecies of de-
positors. In the absence of such deposit insurance, rumours that a bank is on the
brink of failure lead to fears (expectations) that the bank may not be able to repay
all depositors in full and on time because its funds are tied up in loans and other
interest earning assets that cannot be easily converted into cash. This prompts the
depositors to rush and simultaneously attempt to withdraw all their deposits before
the bank runs out of cash, bringing about failure of the bank and hence fulllment
1In the literature, there are two main theoretical views on the causes of banking crises, namely
the fundamental banking crises view and the self-fullling view. While the fundamental banking
crises view perceives banking crises as a consequence of poor economic performance, the self-fullling
view regards them as a realisation of a bad equilibrium arising from self-fullling expectations in
a multiple equilibria framework (see Fontenla and Gonzalez, 2007). In this paper, we test the
self-fullling view while controlling for the fundamental banking crisis view.
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of the prophecy.
Complete deposit insurance in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, therefore,
eliminates depositorsconcerns about the safety of their funds in the event of bank
failure and raises public condence in the banking system as a whole. Thus, deposit
insurance is rationalised directly and indirectly. Directly, it protects depositors as
users of banking products and services and indirectly, it reduces the risk of a systemic
crisis involving, for example, panic withdrawals of deposits from sound banks, and
breakdown of the payments system (MacDonald, 1996).
Deposit insurance, however, also creates a moral hazard problem by freeing economic
agents from the consequences of their actions (see Calomiris, 1990; Gennote and Pyle,
1991; MacDonald, 1996) on both the liability and the asset sides of a banks balance
sheet. On the liability side, depositors feel no longer obliged to assess the credit-risk
associated with depositing money in a particular bank and end up choosing a bank
based on the attractiveness of interest rates on o¤er rather than the banks nancial
condition; while on the asset side, the knowledge that depositors will not su¤er in the
event of bank failure persuades banks to pursue high return risky business strategies
more than they otherwise would (MacDonald, 1996). Thus, the discipline of the
market is removed, excess risk taking by existing commercial banks is encouraged
and depositors of insured institutions have little incentive to discriminate with respect
to where and with whom to place their funds (Calomiris, 1990).
These theoretical arguments have been well supported by empirical research, no-
tably the inuential work of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002). Using data for
61 countries covering the period 1980-1997, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)
show that deposit insurance increases banking fragility, suggesting that the moral
hazard component of deposit insurance is dominant in a general equilibrium frame-
work. Furthermore, they infer from their results that a more generous deposit insur-
ance creates more moral hazard problems which in turn increase banking fragility.
Related work with similar ndings has been carried out by Wheelock and Wilson
(1995), Carapella and Di Giorgio (2004) and Cull, Senbet and Sorge (2005), among
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others.
The validity of some of these ndings has been challenged by recent events. In the
United Kingdom for instance, where deposit insurance is compulsory but coverage
is only partial, Northern Rock Bank was hit by a run on September 14, 2007, which
subdued in the afternoon of September 17, 2007 when the Chancellor of the Exche-
quer announced that the Bank of England would provide full coverage to all deposits
held in the bank. In the United States of America (US), deposit insurance payment
was raised from US$100,000 to US$250,000 per deposit in the thick of the subprime
mortgage crisis in 20082. Both cases suggest that a less generous deposit insurance
may trigger or heighten banking instability while a more generous scheme may quell
the instability.
To disentangle the conicting predictions, we develop a new empirical framework
where we distinguish between banking instability initiated by a bank run or panic
withdrawals of deposits, and banking instability initiated by the insolvency problem
of banks or credit crunch. Using this empirical framework, we estimate a baseline
model whose primary objective is to investigate how banking system instability is
inuenced by moral hazard arising from the adoption of deposit insurance. If the
negative e¤ect of deposit insurance on banking stability is through moral hazard, then
deposit insurance will be associated with banking insolvency and credit crunch more
than with bank runs. The study also explores whether the generosity of deposit
insurance payouts increases the likelihood of banking instability. This analysis is
carried out by testing the proposition that relative to deposit insurance with limited
guarantee, full deposit insurance minimises the likelihood of banking instability. We
further examine the impact of extending coverage of deposit insurance to foreign
exchange and interbank deposits on banking instability. Furthermore, we test the
prediction that banking fragility is a¤ected by the nature of legal authority vested
2In response to the subprime mortgage crisis, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
in the US increased deposit insurance only temporarily, covering the period October 2008 to Decem-
ber 2009, from US$100,000 to US$250,000. The standard coverage limit would return to US$100,000
per deposit on January 1, 2010. In May 2009, Congress extended the $250,000 level to December
31, 2013 (see Alert, 2010).
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in a deposit insurance agency. Specically, we examine how banking instability is
a¤ected by granting the deposit insurance agency the authority to make a decision
to intervene in a banks a¤airs, take legal action against bank directors or other bank
o¢ cials and cancel or revoke deposit insurance for any participating bank. Finally,
we analyse how banking instability is a¤ected by the manner and style in which a
deposit insurance fund is administered. In particular, we examine the e¤ect of the
presence or absence of a coinsurance mechanism, whether membership of a deposit
insurance scheme is compulsory or voluntary, whether the scheme has a permanent
fund or not, whether it is funded by the government, the private sector or jointly by
both, whether premiums are adjusted to risk or not, and whether it is administered
by the private or public sector or both sectors jointly.
Our results from this analysis show that deposit insurance per se has no signicant
e¤ect either on bank runs or on bank insolvency and credit crunch; but when the
deposit insurance is coupled with an increase in credit to the private sector, it has
a positive and signicant link with bank insolvency but not with bank runs. In
addition, we demonstrate that if the deposit insurance is fully guaranteed, then it
increases the likelihood of bank insolvency (signicant at 10%). Moreover, in coun-
tries where the adoption on deposit insurance has been followed by an acceleration in
credit to the private sector, it is signicant at 5%, conrming the importance of moral
hazard in the link between banking insolvency and deposit insurance. Surprisingly
it is also slightly signicant for bank runs, perhaps because of the fair correlation
between bank insolvency and bank runs.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the interrelationships
among deposit insurance, moral hazard and banking instability. An overview of the
estimation methodology, data analysis techniques, scope of coverage, data sources
and variables is presented in Section 3. Estimation results and inferences are outlined
in Section 4. A summary and conclusion follow in Section 5.
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2 Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Banking
Instability
2.1 Deposit Insurance
Deposit insurance can be explicit (formal) or implicit (ad hoc). With explicit deposit
insurance, countries formally commit in advance to guaranteeing some or all of the
deposits of failed banks, usually through legislation (McCoy, 2007). Banks may also
purchase full or partial insurance on behalf of depositors from a government agency or
from a private insurer (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). An implicit system
of deposit protection, on the other hand, is not planned in advance; it is created if
monetary authorities are willing to take measures that would protect depositors in
the event of one or two isolated bank failures, which gives rise to a presumption that
they will take similar action in subsequent cases (MacDonald, 1996). Accordingly,
depositors (correctly) believe that government will either prevent banks from failing,
or that in case of failure, it would step in and compensate them for their losses
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). In this study, we focus on explicit deposit
insurance. The term deposit insurance,therefore, is used to imply explicit deposit
insurance,unless otherwise required to unambiguously distinguish it from implicit
deposit insurance.
In most cases, a deposit insurance scheme is viewed as a supplement to other of-
cial measures such as a system of bank licensing and supervision, which are de-
signed to protect bank depositors from the risk of loss or to contain that risk
(MacDonald, 1996). Thus, even with deposit insurance in place, the central bank
continues to provide bank supervision services and playing the role of lender of last
resort. The central bank lending is widely regarded as part of the public safety net
that supports the stability of the banking system since the bank can avert liquidity
crises by providing large amounts of liquidity on short notice (Marini, 2003)
Consistent with Bagehots principle, the central bank as a lender of last resort is
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presumed to lend only to illiquid but solvent banks (see, for example Fischer, 1999;
Freixas, Giannini, Hoggarth and Soussa, 2000; Wood, 2003; Rochet and Vives, 2004;
Kahn and Santos, 2005). In the wake of a run on a bank, the central bank provides
credit to pay o¤ depositors without having to liquidate the banks assets. Deposit
insurance, on the other hand, ensures that all depositors are paid o¤ to the coverage
limit even if all the banks assets have been liquidated. The complementary roles
of deposit insurance and the central banks lender of last resort function, therefore,
ascertain that depositors do not runon banks, whether they are illiquid or insolvent.
Since the rst recorded scheme in history, deposit insurance has been rationalised
by the desire to instill condence among depositors 0n the safety of their funds,
and consequently guard against panic withdrawals of deposits and breakdown of the
payments system, which may adversely a¤ect the production sector of the economy3.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) demonstrate that full deposit insurance is able to rule
out bank runs. They argue that while uninsured demand deposit contracts are able
to provide liquidity, they leave banks vulnerable to multiple equilibria, one of which is
a bank run where all depositors panic and immediately withdraw their funds because
of concerns with the possibility of the banks failing. Since deposit insurance provides
a safe asset to depositors, they do not rush to withdraw their deposits from insolvent
banks, consequently preventing the costly liquidation of the banksassets that can
aggravate the banks insolvency (Marini, 2003). In a later study, Diamond and
Dybvig (1986) re-a¢ rm that deposit insurance is the only known e¤ective measure
to prevent bank runs.
2.2 Moral Hazard
While deposit insurance may be regarded as a tool for stopping or minimising bank
runs, it is also a source of moral hazard for excessive risk taking, which in turn
3The rst recorded deposit insurance in history is the New York Safety Fund in the US, which
was established in 1829, funded by limited annual contributions of members and regulated by the
state government (see Calomiris, 1990)
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may lead to more bank failures. With deposit insurance, banks are encouraged to
nance high-risk, high-return projects as their ability to attract deposits no longer
reects the risk of their asset portfolio (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). This
crop-up of moral hazard with deposit insurance has been widely supported in the
empirical literature. For instance, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) conclude
that moral hazard matters based on the nding that explicit deposit insurance tends
to increase the likelihood of banking crises. Laeven (2002) observed that the cost of
deposit insurance has some power in predicting bank failures, which he interpreted
as evidence of support for the view that deposit insurance creates moral hazard for
banks. His results further show a strong positive correlation between credit growth
and the cost of deposit insurance, against which he concludes that deposit insurance
promotes excessive risk taking behaviour. In a study of Kansas, Wheelock andWilson
(1995) found out that deposit insurance membership increases the probability of bank
failure, consistent with the hypothesis that insurance encourages banks to hold higher
risk portfolios than they otherwise would. Similar ndings are reported by Carapella
and Di Giorgio (2004), who demonstrate that deposit insurance increases the lending-
deposit spread in banking, the main e¤ect of which arises not from the deposit side,
but from an increase in the lending rate. They interpret this result as evidence of
the presence of moral hazard behaviour emanating from deposit insurance. Cull
et al. (2005) use the volatility of credit to the private sector as a proxy for risk in a
cross-country analysis and establish that the decision to introduce deposit insurance
increases the volatility of credit and hence risky behaviour in the nancial sector,
particularly in countries with weak institutions.
2.3 Banking Instability
Banking instability can be characterised either by a bank run or an insolvency and
a credit crunch crisis. In a bank run, depositors rush to withdraw their deposits in
full following expectations of looming bank failure, consequently forcing the bank to
liquidate its assets at a loss and fail indeed. A number of studies have presented
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various explanations of the trigger mechanism of bank runs. Among the earliest are
Fischer (1911) and Bryant (1980), who hold that a bank run occurs when the value of
the banks total assets falls short of its holdings of deposits, which incites depositors
to rush and quickly withdraw their deposits in order to cut on losses. Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) have also argued that a bank run is caused by a shift in expectations,
which could depend on almost anything (referred to as sunspots run equilibrium)
(see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Adao and Temzelides, 1998; Carmona, 2004). In
yet another explanation, Chari and Jagannathan (1988) maintain that a bank run can
occur even if no one has any adverse information about future returns of the bank.
The essence of the model is that if individuals observe long queues of depositors
at a bank, regardless of the information content held by the people on queues, they
correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate
a bank run. Unlike the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model which presents a bank
run as a bad equilibrium in a series of possible multiple equilibria, the Chari and
Jagannathan (1988) framework models a bank run as an equilibrium phenomenon in
a formulation where all equilibria have bank runs.
Banking instability can also show-up as an insolvency crisis characterised by large
amounts of unanticipated non-performing loans. When depositors perceive that the
returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low, they rush and quickly withdraw
their deposits in full before the bank runs out of cash. This situation is more likely
during an economic downturn and after a period of boom in lending to the private
sector (see Caprio and Klingebiel, 1997; Allen and Gale, 1998).
3 Methodology and Data
3.1 Data and Data Sources
The study is carried out using a panel dataset covering 118 countries over the pe-
riod 1980-2004, implying that the subprime nancial crisis episode is not taken into
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account. The choice of both the number of countries and cut-o¤ dates has been
dictated by data availability. We started o¤ with 211 countries that appear on the
World Bank list of all countries, and eliminated countries where data was not avail-
able, losing 93 countries in the process (see Appendix A for a list of countries in the
sample). Deposit insurance data was collected from Demirgüç-Kunt et al.s (2005)
comprehensive database of deposit insurance around the world. The World Devel-
opment Indicators, a World Bank database of economic and demographic indicators,
was used as a primary source for selected macroeconomic indicators used as control
variables. Additional data was sourced from International Financial Statistics (IFS),
an International Monetary Fund (IMF) database.
In our sample, only 12 countries had deposit insurance at the beginning of the study
period in 1980. The number rose to 27 by 1990 and 52 by 2003 (see Table 1).
According to the data, deposit insurance with unlimited coverage (full guarantee)
is not popular. It had been adopted only in six of the 52 countries with deposit
insurance (in the sample) as at 2003. Coinsurance and risk adjusted deposit insurance
schemes are also rare. In our sample, there were only eight countries with coinsurance
mechanisms and seven with risk adjusted premiums as at 2003.
[Insert Table 1]
We further observe that a large number of countries extend coverage of deposit
insurance to include foreign exchange deposits (30 of the 52 countries in the sample)
while only a few (8 of the 52 countries in the sample) extend coverage to include
interbank deposits. In addition, we observe that most deposit insurance schemes
have a permanent fund. In our sample, 38 countries out of 52, have a permanent
fund in place. On the whole, countries prefer compulsory membership to their deposit
insurance systems. Against the 52 countries that adopted deposit insurance in the
sample, as at 2003, a total of 40 had compulsory membership.
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3.2 Measures of Banking Instability and Moral Hazard
To quantify banking instability, we build on the ideas of Eichengreen, Rose and
Wyplosz (1995; 1996a; 1996b) and Von Hagen and Ho (2007). Using monthly time
series data, we compute deseasonalised growth rates of demand deposits (DDt) and
time deposits (TDt) to construct a measure of bank runs (brunt); and credit extended
to the private sector (CRt) to calculate a measure of insolvency (insolvt).
We follow a four-step procedure. Firstly we compute the deseasonalised growth
rates of each series. For instance the deseasonalised growth rate of demand deposits
(gr_DDt) is computed as:
gr_DDt =
(DDt  DDt 12)
DDt 12
: (1)
The deseasonalised growth rates for time deposits (gr_TDt) and credit to the pri-
vate sector (gr_CRt) are calculated analogously, replacing DDt with TDt and CRt,
respectively.
Secondly, we compute an indices of bank runs and bank insolvency. The index of
bank runs is given by the formula:
runt =

gr_DDt   gr_DDt
gr_DDt

+

gr_TDt   gr_TDt
gr_TDt

=2; (2)
while the index of bank insolvency is given by
solvt =

gr_CRt   gr_CRt
gr_CRt

; (3)
where gr_DDt; gr_TDt and gr_CRt are mean growth rates and gr_DDt ; gr_TDt
and gr_CRt are standard deviations of deseasonalised growth rates of demand de-
posits, time deposits and credit extended to the private sector, respectively.
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Thirdly, given that bank runs and insolvency are generally characterised by a sharp
decrease in bank deposits and credit extended to the private sector, in that order,
we use extreme values of runt and solvt to calculate measures of bank runs and
insolvency denoted as brunt and insolvt, respectively. We distinguish between narrow
and broad denitions of banking instability described by these measures. We dene
the narrow measure of banking instability (nbrun; and ninsolv) as cases where the
calculated indices (run; and solv, respectively) fall within the lowest 5 percent of
the standard normal distribution and we let the measure take the value 1 reecting a
period of banking instability. When the calculated indices fall within the highest 95
percent of the standard normal distribution, we classify this as a period of banking
stability and the measure takes the value zero. The broad denition is characterised
analogously. The indices take the value 1 if they fall within the lowest 10 percent of
the standard normal distribution, which we dene as a period of banking instability,
and zero otherwise.
Fourthly, we convert the data from monthly to annual frequency, we describe any
year that has no recording of banking instability as a year of banking stability and
the variable takes the value zero; a year that has at least on month of recorded
banking instability is dened as a year of banking instability and the variable gets
the value one.
To ascertain that our indicators of banking instability are measuring what is in-
tended, we compare our data with similar data compiled in other studies. Our
measured insolvency, narrowly and broadly dened, compares very well with major
bank insolvencies identied by Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) in selected countries
(Table of comparisons not shown here but available on request). Most of Caprio and
Klingebiels (1997) identied insolvencies are captured in our measures of banking
instability. The few cases that do not match between the two datasets are a con-
sequence of denitional di¤erences between our measures of insolvency and Caprio
and Klingebiels (1997) measures4.
4Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) dene insolvency as a case where the net worth of the banking
system has been entirely or almost eliminated.
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A correlation matrix for the constructed indicators of banking instability shows that
there is a high degree of cross correlation between the narrow and broad denitions
of each of the classications of banking instability (Table not shown here but avail-
able on request). This is not unexpected since the broad denitions contain all the
information in the corresponding narrow denitions of banking instability plus some
additional information.
On the whole, however, the correlations between the four identiers of banking in-
stability show relatively low cross correlations, indicating that banking instability
may occur due to insolvency or bank runs only. That is, the two need not neces-
sarily occur together. This nding demonstrates the importance of distinguishing
between the two forms of banking instability, an approach that has been adopted in
this study.
3.3 Moral Hazard and Control Variables
Wemeasure moral hazard using the ratio of private sector credit to real GDP (crgdp).
In fact, many studies have considered a sharp increase of this variable as a sign of
moral hazard in the banking system.
We use six control variables, namely, growth of real gross domestic product (GDP)
(gdpgr), real interest rates (rir), ination rates (inflatn), ratio of M2 to foreign
exchange reserves (m2fxres) ; exchange rate depreciation (xrdepr) and GDP per
capita (gdppc) to control for macroeconomic factors that are expected to have a
signicant impact on banking fragility (the fundamental banking instability view)
(see Section B in the Appendix for brief denitions of variables used in the model
and how they are measured). Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002),
ination, real GDP growth and real interest rates are used to capture macroeconomic
developments that are likely to a¤ect the quality of bank assets. Higher values of real
GDP growth reect a higher ability of borrowers to repay their loans while higher
ination rates entail higher operating costs and a lower ability of borrowers to repay
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their loans. Real interest rates are expected to have an adverse e¤ect on banks
protability through their impact on the cost of funds. Besides being associated
with high default rates, high real interest rates indicate high cost of funds to banks.
Since bank loans and other assets are usually xed over long periods, rising real
interest rates push up the cost of funds, adversely a¤ecting the liability side of the
banksbalance sheets and consequently squeezing the banksprots.
Exchange rate depreciation and the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves are used
to capture commercial banksvulnerability to sudden capital outows triggered by
a run on the currency and the banksexposure to foreign exchange risk (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) argue that
since deposit insurance guarantees the domestic value of deposits and not their foreign
currency value, the expectation of a devaluation triggers withdrawals of domestic
currency deposits to purchase foreign assets even in the presence of deposit insurance.
Finally, GDP per capita is used to capture institutional as well as regulatory char-
acteristics of countries in every time period. An increase in GDP per capita can
be interpreted as an improvement of institutional quality as well as banking system
regulatory framework.
3.4 Deposit Insurance Variables
A simple dummy variable, which takes the value 1 when a country has deposit in-
surance and zero otherwise, is used to investigate the e¤ect of deposit insurance on
banking instability. As explained already alluded to, the theory in inconclusive on
whether deposit insurance destabilises or stabilises the banking system. Most em-
pirical studies, albeit without distinguishing between banking instability caused by
bank runs and banking instability caused by insolvency of banks, have found that
deposit insurance increases the vulnerability of a banking system to instability (see
Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Pazarbasioglu and Billings, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detra-
giache, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002).
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To examine the behaviour of banking instability in relation to certain features of
deposit insurance, we estimate four sets of equations, each characterising particular
features in the design of deposit insurance, namely, generosity of payouts, coverage,
legal environment and administration of the deposit insurance. Generosity of pay-
outsis represented by a single variable, guarantee, which takes the value one if a
country has full deposit insurance (unlimited guarantee) and zero if the deposit in-
surance scheme provides partial coverage (limited guarantee). Demirgüç-Kunt et al.
(2005) argue that in any deposit insurance scheme, the amount of coverage mat-
ters since it directly a¤ects market discipline exerted by depositors. The sign of the
marginal e¤ects of guarantee on banking instability, cannot be determined a pri-
ori. In fact, full deposit insurance is expected to be associated with a marginally
low likelihood of banking instability if the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) hypothesis is cor-
rect; whereas if the moral hazard problem dominates, full deposit insurance will be
associated with a high probability of banking instability.
Coverageis captured in two variables namely, whether or not interbank deposits
are covered (intbank) and whether or not foreign currency deposits are covered
(fxcoverd). Countries with deposit insurance need to decide on the type of de-
posits to be covered and the type of nancial institutions to be included or excluded
from the coverage.
There are three variables capturing the Legal environment, each answers one of the
following Yes/No questions:
(i) Does the deposit insurance authority have the mandate to intervene in a banks
a¤airs (interven)?
(ii) Does the deposit insurance authority have the legal power to cancel or revoke
deposit insurance for any participating bank (leglcancel)?
(iii) Can the deposit insurance agency/fund take legal action against bank directors
or other bank o¢ cials (leglmgr)?
An explicit deposit insurance scheme founded on a sound legal system with proper
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enforcement mechanisms is a priori expected to command credibility. Banks are
likely to be restrained from indulging in certain activities that interfere with banking
stability while depositors are reassured of the safety of their funds even in the event
of bank failure. The expected outcome, therefore, is banking stability. This state,
however, may also create moral hazard. With a credible deposit insurance scheme,
depositors are no longer persuaded to place their deposits in banks chosen on the basis
of their nancial condition. They will probably choose banks solely in accordance
with the interest rates they o¤er; and banks, on their part, may undertake more risky
business strategies than they otherwise would, given the knowledge that depositors
will not su¤er in the event of bank failure (MacDonald, 1996). For these reasons, the
expected signs of the legal environment indicators are indeterminate a priori.
Administrationis covered in six variables, namely, whether the deposit insurance
is administered by government, by the private sector or jointly by government and
the private sector (admin); whether there is coinsurance or not (coinsur); whether
the deposit insurance is funded or not (funding); whether deposit insurance pre-
miums are risk adjusted or not (rskadj); whether membership to the deposit in-
surance scheme is compulsory or voluntary (membship); and whether the deposit
insurance is solely funded by government or by the private sector or jointly by the
two (sourcefnd). In all cases, the signs of the marginal e¤ects may be positive or
negative depending on whether the moral hazard problem is dominant or not.
With a coinsurance system, depositors are required to bear part of the cost in the
event of bank failure (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005). The system, therefore, is used
as a technique for quelling moral hazard (McCoy, 2007). It provides a risk-sharing
mechanism between depositors and the insurer, thereby instilling a considerable de-
gree of market discipline (Talley and Mas, 1990) that minimises the probability of
banking instability. To the extent that some component of deposits is left uninsured,
depositors are incentivised to monitor the nancial condition of their banks, which
leads to market discipline in the banking industry. By exposing some of the deposits
to non-protection, however, coinsurance may also increase the probability of bank
runs. On rumours that a bank is likely to fail, its depositors may run on it to secure
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the uninsured component of their deposits. Since coinsurance is expressed as a com-
ponent of the deposit, depositors will simultaneously attempt to withdraw all their
funds to ensure that they minimise their losses. On their part, banks may undertake
high-risk high-return projects proportionate to the level of their clients deposits
that are covered by the deposit insurance, which may increase the probability of
insolvency.
3.5 Model and Estimation
We employ the random e¤ects logit model to estimate the probability of banking
instability using the maximum likelihood method. The logit is a large-sample tech-
nique which has been commonly used in a number of similar studies (see, for example
Cole and Gunther, 1995; Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al., 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and De-
tragiache, 1998). Our use of the random e¤ects (rather than xed e¤ects) is aimed
at preserving information. If xed e¤ects (rather than random e¤ects) are included
in the model, it may require omitting from the panel all countries that did not expe-
rience banking instability during the period under consideration, which would imply
throwing away a large amount of information (see Greene, 2003; Demirgüç-Kunt
and Detragiache, 1998). In addition, limiting the panel to countries with banking
instability only would produce a biased sample (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache,
Ibid).
4 Results Analysis
Prior to the presentation and the analysis of the model results, we provide in Table
2 the summary of the main descriptive statistics of all the variables that we will use.
From this table we can observe that data on the design of deposit insurance are most
often unavailable. We also provide in Tables 3 , 4 and 5 , the correlations coe¢ cients
of variables. We observe from it that generally correlation between variables are low,
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therefore the risk of multicollinearity in our result is weak.
[Insert Tables 2, 3 , 4 and 5]
4.1 Baseline Model
In this section we present and discuss estimation of the model with broad indicators
of banking instability. The narrow indicators are used to study robustness and
sensitivity of the result.
Bank Runs and Deposit Insurance. Table 6 presents regression results showing
the relationship between bank runs (broadly dened) and deposit insurance control-
ling for macroeconomic conditions. From this table, we nd that deposit insurance
per se is not statistically signicant in explaining bank runs i.e. it appears ine¢ cient
in reducing the likelihood of bank runs in a given economy. It is observed, however,
that with deposit insurance in place, the probability of bank runs increases signi-
cantly with rising interest rates and decreases with GDP growth. This may be due to
the e¤ect of business cycles on the e¤ectiveness of deposit insurance in reducing the
probability of bank runs. A rationale of this nding is that deposit insurance schemes
may lack credibility in economic downturns, especially in developing countries.
[Insert Table 6].
Bank Insolvency, Credit Crunch and Deposit Insurance. Table 7 presents
regression results showing the relationship between bank insolvency (broadly dened)
and deposit insurance. The estimation results reveal that deposit insurance does not
signicantly explain insolvency, either. The only case where it is signicant is when
it is interacted with an increase in the ratio of private sector credit to GDP. In this
case it increases the probability of banking insolvency. It follows, therefore, that
when deposit insurance is coupled with an increase in credit to the private sector
relative to the size of the economy (i.e., a measure of moral hazard), it increases
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the likelihood of insolvency and credit crunch. There are many regulatory tools to
control for risky lending in many banking systems. These can mitigate the e¤ect
of deposit insurance in increasing moral hazard behaviour. In countries where these
tools are missing or where these regulations are not well enforced, deposit insurance
can create moral hazard which will then translate into a higher probability of bank
insolvency and credit crunch.
[Insert Table 7]
4.2 Design Features of Deposit Insurance
Generosity of Payouts. Estimation results presented in Table 8 and Table 9 show
that guarantee has signicant marginal e¤ects (at 10 percent) and is positively cor-
related with banking instability characterised by bank runs as well as insolvency, sug-
gesting that full deposit insurance is associated with some susceptibility to banking
instability. More importantly the interaction term of guarantee and crgdp signi-
cantly increases the probability of bank runs and bank insolvency. This result about
bank runs is at odds with Diamond and Dybvig (1983) which demonstrates that full
deposit insurance rules out bank runs. Increasing the generosity of deposit insurance
payouts reassures depositors that higher proportions of their deposits are protected
in the event of bank failure, and e¤ectively minimises any incentives the depositors
may have of running on a bank on rumours that the bank is on the brink of failure.
The theory, however, also counter argues that the moral hazard problem is at the
maximum when the coverage of deposit insurance is unlimited (MacDonald, 1996).
E¤ectively, full deposit insurance takes away any incentives from depositors to moni-
tor the nancial soundness of their bankers. The banks, on their part, are incentivised
to undertake more risky high return projects on the basis that their customers may
su¤er reduced losses in the event of failure of the projects.
[Insert Table 8 and Table 9]
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Our empirical result then suggests than in an economy with a more generous deposit
insurance scheme, the moral hazard problem dominates, making it more vulnera-
ble to banking fragility triggered by insolvency problems as well as bank runs. We,
therefore, argue that if moral hazard can be triggered by bank insolvency and credit
crunch, it has also some probability of causing a bank run. A probable explanation
is that when the banking system is facing a crisis, depositors do not know the exact
cause and given that some depositors do not trust the government guarantee (spe-
cially in low income countries and in countries facing budgetary di¢ culties), they
will run on the bank to cut on their losses that may accrue when the bank eventually
fails.
Coverage. Table 10 presents estimation results illustrating the impact of extending
deposit insurance coverage to foreign currency and interbank deposits on banking
instability. The table shows that marginal e¤ects of both variables are insignicant
for both types of banking instability, illustrating that whether foreign currency or
interbank deposits are covered by a deposit insurance scheme or not does not sig-
nicantly a¤ect banking fragility. While a more comprehensive coverage provides
a better guarantee against depositor runs, the theory suggests that it also creates
more incentives for excessive risk taking (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002).
Exclusion of interbank deposits in the coverage of insured deposits, for instance,
may increase the probability of banking instability because banks, who are regarded
as the most well informed depositors, are now without protection and may lead to
a run at the slightest suspicion of failure in one of the banks holding their deposits.
Also, in the event that one bank fails, other banks that had placed deposits in the
failing bank would sustain losses that would weaken their nancial position, mak-
ing them susceptible to failure too (see Talley and Mas, 1990). Inclusion of the
interbank deposits in the coverage of insured deposits, on the other hand, may also
increase the likelihood of banking instability, since the banks now have no incentive
to monitor each others nancial conditions. In the process, market discipline dete-
riorates leading to excessive risk-taking behaviour by the banks. Our result shows
that empirically, none of these two contradictory arguments is dominant.
20
[Insert Table 10]
Foreign currency deposits coverage in a deposit insurance scheme does not necessarily
reassure depositors of the safety of their funds in the event of bank failure. One
reason, particularly applicable to developing countries, is that the deposit insurance
companies might not be able to acquire needed foreign exchange in order to pay
o¤ holders of the foreign currency deposits, which may compel the depositors to
force the agency into bankruptcy for failing to honour its obligations (see Talley
and Mas, 1990). If insurances companies have the option of paying o¤ the foreign
currency deposits in local currency at the prevailing exchange rate, the depositors
may end up in a worse o¤ position as the exchange rate may not be realistic enough
to compensate them for their foreign currency deposits lost in the failed bank (Ibid,
1990).
Some studies suggest that the inclusion of foreign currency deposits in deposit in-
surance coverage makes a banking system more vulnerable to instability (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). Coverage of foreign currency deposits may also serve
to reassure depositors of the safety of their funds. While this reassurance may take
away the depositorsincentives to monitor the nancial soundness of their bankers,
leading to increased risk-taking behaviour by the banks and hence a higher probabil-
ity of banking instability, it may also prevent bank runs. Even in the wake of news
that a bank is likely to fail, the depositors may not run on the bank because they
are assured of the safety of their funds.
Legal Environment. Estimation results illustrating the importance of the legal
environment in explaining banking instability are presented in Table 11. Two of
the legal environment indicators, interven and leglmgr have insignicant marginal
e¤ects, suggesting that whether or not a deposit insurance agency has the legal
mandate to intervene in the a¤airs of a bank or to take legal action against bank
directors or other bank o¢ cials has no bearing on a countrys banking stability.
The third indicator, leglcancel is positively related to banking instability and is
statistically signicant, albeit only for the bank runs equation.
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[Insert Table 11]
This outcome demonstrates that conferring a deposit insurance company with legal
powers to cancel or revoke deposit insurance for any participating bank increases
the likelihood of bank runs (broadly dened with foreign liabilities excluded in the
denition of deposits). While deposit insurance assures economic agents of the safety
of their insured deposits, the speed at which they can get their money in the event
of bank failure remains of concern. A deposit insurance agency that has the legal
authority to close a bank, therefore, may indeed fuel a bank run on rumours that the
bank is on the brink of failure5. In this state, economic agents will simultaneously
queue to withdraw their funds, not because they doubt the safety of their funds, but
because they want to have access to their money when they need it.
Moreover, an explicit deposit insurance scheme founded on a sound legal system
with proper enforcement mechanisms is a priori expected to command credibility.
Banks are likely to be restrained from indulging in certain activities that interfere
with banking stability while depositors are reassured of the safety of their funds even
in the event of bank failure. The expected outcome, therefore, is banking stability.
This state, however, may also create moral hazard. With a credible deposit insurance
scheme, depositors are no longer persuaded to place their deposits in banks chosen
on the basis of their nancial condition. They will probably choose banks solely in
accordance with the interest rates they o¤er; and banks, on their part, may undertake
more risky business strategies than they otherwise would, given the knowledge that
depositors will not su¤er in the event of bank failure (MacDonald, 1996).
Administration. Table 12 presents estimation results of the deposit insurance
administration indicators. We nd that the impact of coinsurance on the probability
of bank runs is insignicant.
5In countries where deposit insurance membership is compulsory, cancellation of a participating
banks deposit insurance membership implies cancellation of the banks banking licence. Since
deposit insurance membership is compulsory in most countries, we generalise that if a deposit
insurance agency has the mandate to cancel or revoke membership for any participating bank, it
e¤ectively holds the authority to close the bank.
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[Insert Table 12]
We also nd that countries with a permanent fund of the deposit insurance scheme
are more prone to banking instability than countries with a non-funded system of
deposit insurance. In a funded deposit insurance (permanent fund) system, members
or the government make periodic contributions to the fund, which are then used as a
primary resource base for paying out depositors in the event of bank failure; and in
a non-funded system, members pay their contributions to the fund after bank failure
has already occurred (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005). Consistent with the theoretical
literature and the ndings of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), the marginal
e¤ects of funding type are positive and signicant, indicating that deposit insurance
schemes with a permanent fund give rise to moral hazard, which in turn leads to
banking instability.
Further, we establish that the source of funding for a deposit insurance scheme
does not a¤ect the probability of bank runs. Government funded deposit insurance
schemes, however, increase the probability of insolvency of banks. The table reveals
that the probability of insolvency of banks is lowest when a deposit insurance scheme
is wholly funded by the private sector, increases in cases of joint funding by the
government and the private sector, and it is highest when the government is the sole
nancier.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
To ensure that our estimation results are robust we consider a sensitivity analysis
where we re-estimate the regressions using nbrun and ninsolv as new dependent
variables. We nd that the results are almost the same. Precisely we nd that deposit
insurance has no signicant e¤ect on the probability of bank runs but that it increases
the probability of the banking system to su¤er from insolvency and credit crunch
crisis in countries where the adoption of the deposit insurance has been followed by
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moral hazard behavior, captured by an increase of the ratio of credit to the private
sector (estimation results not included but available on request).
5 Conclusions
This paper set out to investigate the role moral hazard plays in the e¤ectivity of de-
posit insurance in achieving banking system stability. Using a new empirical frame-
work that distinguishes banking instability triggered by bank runs from banking
instability caused by insolvency of banks or credit crunch, the study nds weak
evidence that deposit insurance is associated with moral hazard, which has the con-
sequence of causing bank insolvency or credit crunch that ultimately triggers a run
on banks. While our results do not necessarily refute ndings in the earlier litera-
ture because of di¤erences in measurement of the banking instability variable, we lay
claim to having presented more expressive ndings following our distinction of bank
runs as well as insolvency and credit crunch of the banking system as identiers of
banking instability. In addition to the core ndings, the study also establishes that a
country is more vulnerable to banking instability when it has a more generous deposit
insurance scheme, when the deposit insurance agency has a legal mandate to cancel
or revoke deposit insurance for any participating bank, when the deposit insurance
has a permanent fund, and when the scheme is funded jointly by the government
and the private sector or solely by the government. We argue that since there are
many types of regulation in any given banking system, it may be di¢ cult to study
with complete condence the e¤ect of a given banking regulation alone. Perhaps it
is the combination of many types of regulation which matter.
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APPENDIX
A Country Sample
A.1 Countries with Explicit Deposit Insurance
Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Congo,
Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Nether-
lands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey,
Uganda, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe.
A.2 Countries with Implicit Deposit Insurance
Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,
China, Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Dominica, Egypt (Arab Republic), Equatorial
Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Iran (Islamic
Republic), Israel, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Macao China, Maldives,
Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea,
Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands,
South Africa, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan,
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela
(Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen (Republic), and Zambia.
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B Denitions and Measurement of Deposit Insur-
ance Variables
 admin: Administration of deposit insurance. It takes the value 3 if adminis-
tration is private, 1 if it is o¢ cial and 2 if it is joint.
 coinsur: Coinsurance. It takes the value 1 if there is coinsurance of the deposit
insurance scheme and zero otherwise.
 crgdp: Ratio of domestic private sector credit to GDP.
 dinsur: Deposit insurance. It takes the value 1 when a country has explicit
deposit insurance and zero otherwise.
 funding: Permanent fund. It takes the value 1 if the deposit insurance is
funded and zero otherwise. In a funded deposit insurance system, members or
government make periodic contributions to the fund, which is then used as the
main source for paying out depositors in the event of bank failure (Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2005). In a non-funded system, on the other hand, members pay
their contributions to the fund after a bank failure has already occurred. As at
2003, only 14 countries out of 88 had unfunded deposit insurance, 11 of which
were European and Chile was the only country with the government as a sole
contributor to the fund (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005).
 fxcoverd: Foreign currency deposits covered. The variable takes the value
1 if foreign currency deposits are covered by the deposit insurance and zero
otherwise.
 gdpgr: GDP growth.
 guarantee: Deposits guaranteed coverage. The variable takes the value 2 in the
case of unlimited guarantee (full coverage), 1 in the case of limited guarantee
(partial coverage) and zero otherwise.
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 inflatn: Ination measured by year on year percentage changes in the all items
national composite consumer price index.
 intbank: Interbank deposits covered. The variable takes the value 1 if interbank
deposits are covered by the deposit insurance and zero otherwise.
 interven: Does the deposit insurance authority make the decision to intervene
a bank? The variable takes the the value 1 if yes and zero otherwise.
 legalcancel: Does the deposit insurance authority have the legal power to
cancel or revoke deposit insurance for any participating bank? The variable
takes the value 1 if yes and zero otherwise.
 legalmgr: Can the deposit insurance agency/fund take legal action against
bank directors or other bank o¢ cials? The variable takes the value 1 if yes and
zero otherwise.
 m2fxres: Ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves.
 membship: Membership takes the value 1 if a¢ liating to a deposit insurance
scheme is compulsory and zero if it is voluntary. In most countries (almost 90
percent as of 2003), membership to a deposit insurance is compulsory.
 rir: Real interest rates.
 rskadj: Risk adjusted premiums. It takes the value 1 in cases where premiums
vary according to riskiness of the assessment base and zero otherwise. The
number of countries with risk adjusted premiums has risen from only the United
States in 1995 to 20 as at 2003 (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005).
 sourcefnd: Source of funding. It takes the value 2 if the deposit insurance is
solely funded by the government, zero if it is privately funded and 1 if funded
jointly by the government and the private sector.
 xrdepr: Exchange rate depreciation.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Deposit Insurance Around the World
1980 1980 - 1986- 1991- 1996- 2001-
1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
Number of countries
with deposit
insurance 12 19 27 34 46 52
Number of countries with
unlimited guarantee
(full) deposit insurance 3 3 4 5 9 6
Number of countries
with coinsurance 3 4 6 7 8 8
Number of countries with
risk adjusted premiums
of deposit insurance 1 2 3 6 7 7
Number of countries with
deposit insurance covering
foreign exchange deposits 10 14 18 25 31 32
Number of countries with
deposit insurance covering
interbank deposits 2 3 4 5 8 8
Number of countries with
deposit insurance with a
permanent fund 10 15 22 29 37 39
Number of countries with
a compulsory membership
deposit insurance 10 15 23 32 40 42
NOTE: - All gures are for end period
Source: (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005)
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of all Variables
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
bbrun 2004 .2689621 .549147 0 2
binsolv 2152 .1988848 .4815891 0 2
inatn 2625 41.83701 437.4305 -13.06 13109.5
gdppc 2625 5345.975 7518.184 102.36 38236
incomgrp 2625 .7371429 .6898183 0 2
m2fxres 2625 85.12849 1584.567 0 72987.56
rir 2625 -.476918 44.43865 -99.24 2104.61
gdpgr 2625 3.370693 4.899869 -41.01 50.69
crgdp 2594 41.46455 36.52356 .02 231.08
xrdepr 2620 -7.826172 17.43592 -99.96 41.55
creditgr 2589 6.416377 29.30584 -100 821.33
dinsur 2625 .2756495 .4462232 0 1
guarantee 1250 .684 .618749 0 2
fxcoverd 692 .7066474 .455628 0 1
intbank 692 .1705202 .3763612 0 1
interven 610 .144459 .3705529 0 2.23
leglcancel 610 .4353115 .6227193 0 5.47
leglmgr 581 .5748709 .4947886 0 1
admin 686 1.54519 .7250463 1 3
coinsur 1248 .0985577 .2981867 0 1
funding 692 .8482659 .3590225 0 1
rskadj 684 .1578947 .3649091 0 1
membship 684 .8845029 .3198548 0 1
sourcefnd 677 .7429838 .4974479 0 2
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Table 3: Pairwise Correlations Coe¢ cients between Variables
binsolv bbrun inatn gdppc incomgrp m2fxres rir gdpgr crgdp
binsolv 1.0000
bbrun 0.3492 1.0000
inatn 0.0278 0.0314 1.0000
gdppc -0.0108 -0.0635 -0.0383 1.0000
incomgrp -0.0044 -0.0701 -0.0535 0.7812 1.0000
m2fxres -0.0336 0.0192 0.0043 -0.0311 -0.0468 1.0000
rir -0.0454 -0.0433 0.1575 0.0265 0.0457 -0.0275 1.0000
gdpgr -0.1098 -0.1418 -0.0881 -0.0325 0.0054 -0.0368 -0.0322 1.0000
crgdp 0.0345 -0.0285 -0.0316 0.7086 0.6474 -0.0226 0.0473 -0.0126 1.0000
xrdepr -0.0840 -0.1123 -0.2966 0.1901 0.1758 -0.0080 -0.0244 0.1532 0.2076
creditgr -0.1397 -0.0769 0.0389 0.0116 0.0191 0.0111 0.0379 0.1535 0.0686
dinsur 0.0146 -0.0378 -0.0286 0.4572 0.3749 -0.0309 0.0172 -0.0075 0.3511
guarantee 0.0645 0.0095 -0.0832 0.2072 0.1985 0.0345 -0.0182 -0.0203 0.1559
fxcoverd 0.0270 -0.0806 0.0628 -0.1070 0.0750 -0.4113 -0.0149 -0.0194 -0.2346
intbank 0.0462 0.0379 -0.0305 -0.2688 -0.3051 0.1068 -0.0444 0.0053 -0.1366
interven 0.0510 -0.0397 -0.0422 -0.0433 0.0303 0.0964 0.0209 -0.0710 -0.0589
leglcancel 0.0946 0.0110 -0.0711 0.0354 -0.0503 -0.0132 -0.0449 0.0474 -0.0816
leglmgr -0.0778 0.0134 0.1023 -0.2574 -0.1414 -0.1706 -0.0003 -0.0717 -0.2840
admin 0.0175 0.0230 0.0377 0.3232 0.3038 -0.0088 0.0418 -0.1684 0.2137
coinsur 0.0051 -0.0342 -0.0355 0.2354 0.2771 -0.0240 0.0035 0.0263 0.2551
funding -0.1183 0.0422 0.0480 -0.1445 -0.2112 0.1941 -0.0261 -0.0018 -0.2030
rskadj 0.0301 0.0036 -0.0047 -0.0270 0.1363 -0.1812 -0.0068 -0.0676 -0.1263
membship 0.0191 -0.0117 -0.2129 0.0213 0.0791 -0.0052 -0.0440 0.0336 -0.0247
sourcefnd 0.0914 -0.0097 -0.0952 -0.3765 -0.3344 0.1313 -0.0851 0.1279 -0.2112
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Table 4: Pairwise Correlations Coe¢ cients between Variables, Cont.
xrdepr creditgr dinsur guarantee fxcoverd intbank interven leglcancel leglmgr
xrdepr 1.0000
creditgr 0.0537 1.0000
dinsur 0.0777 -0.0140 1.0000
guarantee 0.1230 -0.0557 0.8708 1.0000
fxcoverd -0.1196 0.0068 0.1833 0.2366 1.0000
intbank -0.0247 -0.0363 0.0708 -0.0155 -0.0623 1.0000
interven 0.0614 -0.0146 0.0411 -0.1227 -0.0250 0.4022 1.0000
leglcancel 0.1157 0.0408 0.0246 -0.0781 -0.1093 0.1068 0.4261 1.0000
leglmgr -0.2122 -0.0664 0.0242 0.2140 0.1358 0.2866 0.1577 -0.2008 1.0000
admin 0.0483 -0.0704 0.0685 0.1440 0.0724 -0.1747 -0.0699 0.1119 -0.0925
coinsur 0.1363 0.0031 0.2795 0.1691 0.2569 -0.2115 -0.0864 -0.1494 0.1065
funding -0.1178 0.0251 -0.0419 0.0440 -0.2725 0.1061 -0.0332 0.1096 0.1090
rskadj -0.0910 -0.0267 0.0442 0.1563 0.2813 -0.1896 0.0255 -0.0322 0.0759
membship 0.2065 0.0024 -0.0567 -0.2172 0.1557 0.1582 0.1174 -0.1461 0.1983
sourcefnd -0.0241 0.0049 0.2011 0.2250 0.0378 0.2277 0.2076 0.0367 0.0303
Table 5: Pairwise Correlations Coe¢ cients between Variables, Cont.
admin coinsur funding rskadj membship source d
admin 1.0000
coinsur -0.0624 1.0000
funding 0.0275 -0.2455 1.0000
rskadj 0.3387 -0.2035 -0.0308 1.0000
membship -0.2462 0.1698 -0.1469 0.1565 1.0000
sourcefnd -0.2265 -0.1443 -0.0757 0.1441 0.1453 1.0000
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Table 6: Bank runs and deposit insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables bbrun bbrun bbrun bbrun bbrun bbrun bbrun
gdpgr -0.0608*** -0.0533*** -0.0604*** -0.0601*** -0.0609*** -0.0610*** -0.0601***
(0.0124) (0.0130) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125)
rir -0.00705* -0.00731* -0.00704* -0.0136*** -0.00821** -0.00689* -0.00664
(0.00409) (0.00406) (0.00410) (0.00526) (0.00401) (0.00410) (0.00407)
inatn -0.000219 -0.000207 -0.000213 -0.000276 -0.000251 -0.000210 -0.000207
(0.000183) (0.000180) (0.000181) (0.000195) (0.000203) (0.000181) (0.000180)
m2fxres 0.000106 0.000101 0.000108 0.000112 0.000114 0.000111 0.000110
(0.000120) (0.000119) (0.000121) (0.000123) (0.000122) (0.000123) (0.000122)
crgdp 0.00235 0.00206 0.00239 0.00287 0.00250 0.00176 0.000447
(0.00224) (0.00225) (0.00225) (0.00230) (0.00227) (0.00231) (0.00257)
xrdepr -0.0136*** -0.0126*** -0.0138*** -0.0131*** -0.0129*** -0.0138*** -0.0139***
(0.00373) (0.00376) (0.00376) (0.00379) (0.00385) (0.00379) (0.00378)
gdppc -2.06e-05* -2.07e-05* -4.33e-05** -2.58e-05** -2.48e-05** -2.84e-05** -3.18e-05**
(1.21e-05) (1.16e-05) (1.91e-05) (1.17e-05) (1.16e-05) (1.21e-05) (1.26e-05)
dinsur -0.132
(0.155)
gdpgrdinsur -0.0543*
(0.0309)
gdppcdinsur 2.23e-05
(1.73e-05)
rirdinsur 0.0150**
(0.00703)
inatndinsur 0.000779
(0.000760)
m2fxresdinsur 0.0157
(0.00995)
crgdpdinsur 0.00399
(0.00248)
Constant -1.198*** -1.193*** -1.187*** -1.239*** -1.219*** -1.201*** -1.170***
(0.118) (0.116) (0.118) (0.119) (0.117) (0.118) (0.120)
Observations 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980
No. of countries 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Bank insolvency and deposit insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables binsolv binsolv binsolv binsolv binsolv binsolv binsolv
gdpgr -0.0561*** -0.0529*** -0.0555*** -0.0564*** -0.0566*** -0.0561*** -0.0547***
(0.0141) (0.0149) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0142)
rir -0.00420 -0.00432 -0.00392 -0.00222 -0.00347 -0.00411 -0.00340
(0.00417) (0.00417) (0.00412) (0.00476) (0.00473) (0.00416) (0.00403)
inatn -1.63e-05 -1.51e-05 -1.85e-05 -6.46e-06 -1.20e-05 -1.84e-05 -1.48e-05
(0.000154) (0.000154) (0.000154) (0.000154) (0.000156) (0.000154) (0.000154)
m2fxres -0.000780 -0.000793 -0.000812 -0.000787 -0.000803 -0.000811 -0.000790
(0.000754) (0.000759) (0.000771) (0.000759) (0.000761) (0.000779) (0.000758)
crgdp 0.00513 0.00529 0.00488 0.00517 0.00510 0.00510 0.00127
(0.00339) (0.00337) (0.00339) (0.00336) (0.00335) (0.00340) (0.00405)
xrdepr -0.0249*** -0.0242*** -0.0250*** -0.0241*** -0.0261*** -0.0247*** -0.0252***
(0.00468) (0.00471) (0.00468) (0.00474) (0.00475) (0.00466) (0.00469)
gdppc -1.24e-05 -8.06e-06 -4.36e-05 -8.16e-06 -8.12e-06 -1.12e-05 -1.98e-05
(2.03e-05) (1.99e-05) (2.91e-05) (1.97e-05) (1.95e-05) (2.00e-05) (2.07e-05)
dinsur 0.135
(0.214)
gdpgrdinsur -0.0225
(0.0355)
gdppcdinsur 4.13e-05
(2.55e-05)
rirdinsur -0.0199
(0.0162)
inatndinsur -0.00372
(0.00332)
m2fxresdinsur 0.00704
(0.0136)
crgdpdinsur 0.00646**
(0.00321)
Observations 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135
No. of countries 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
37
Table 8: Bank run and the generosity of deposit insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables bbrun bbrun bbrun bbrun bbrun bbrun bbrun
gdpgr -0.0772** -0.0994** -0.0798** -0.0727* -0.0766** -0.0743** -0.0772**
(0.0366) (0.0435) (0.0368) (0.0372) (0.0368) (0.0369) (0.0367)
rir 0.00115 0.00110 0.000811 0.00450 0.00143 0.00156 0.000945
(0.00637) (0.00641) (0.00633) (0.00733) (0.00645) (0.00646) (0.00631)
inatn -0.000198 -0.000321 -0.000209 -0.000443 -0.000248 -0.000244 -0.000201
(0.000886) (0.000897) (0.000879) (0.00101) (0.000898) (0.000900) (0.000877)
m2fxres 0.000283* 0.000291 0.000261 0.000308 0.000286 0.000302 0.000272
(0.000171) (0.000183) (0.000169) (0.000190) (0.000184) (0.000184) (0.000170)
crgdp 0.00809** 0.00903** 0.0100*** 0.00946** 0.00920** 0.00840** 0.00484
(0.00379) (0.00389) (0.00375) (0.00404) (0.00394) (0.00397) (0.00415)
xrdepr -0.0231** -0.0260*** -0.0235*** -0.0224** -0.0245** -0.0249*** -0.0236***
(0.00920) (0.00931) (0.00911) (0.00956) (0.00976) (0.00935) (0.00914)
gdppc -1.16e-05 -1.66e-05 -2.85e-05 -1.72e-05 -1.74e-05 -1.06e-05 -1.32e-06
(1.91e-05) (1.98e-05) (1.94e-05) (2.08e-05) (2.01e-05) (2.05e-05) (1.98e-05)
guarantee 0.631*
(0.369)
gdpgrguarantee 0.0648
(0.0626)
gdppcguarantee 7.12e-05***
(2.76e-05)
rirguarantee -0.0648**
(0.0312)
inatnguarantee 0.00276
(0.00871)
m2fxresguarantee 0.0938*
(0.0539)
crgdpguarantee 0.0111**
(0.00476)
Observations 581 581 581 581 581 581 581
No. of countries 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Bank insolvency and the generosity of deposit insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables binsolv binsolv binsolv binsolv binsolv binsolv binsolv
gdpgr -0.0778* -0.0225 -0.0754* -0.0841** -0.0800* -0.0796* -0.0752*
(0.0418) (0.0452) (0.0418) (0.0419) (0.0420) (0.0427) (0.0417)
rir -0.0489** -0.0458** -0.0500** -0.0638** -0.0477** -0.0502** -0.0512**
(0.0208) (0.0220) (0.0206) (0.0255) (0.0212) (0.0219) (0.0207)
inatn -0.0130 -0.00962 -0.0131 -0.0133* -0.0129 -0.0126 -0.0125
(0.00845) (0.00767) (0.00821) (0.00789) (0.00886) (0.00859) (0.00799)
m2fxres -0.00225 -0.00309 -0.00207 -0.00260 -0.00248 -0.00744 -0.00185
(0.00540) (0.0111) (0.00433) (0.00705) (0.00655) (0.0150) (0.00354)
crgdp 0.00719 0.00874* 0.00816* 0.00774* 0.00798* 0.00605 0.00263
(0.00439) (0.00488) (0.00420) (0.00449) (0.00444) (0.00473) (0.00496)
xrdepr -0.0314** -0.0263** -0.0321** -0.0342*** -0.0318** -0.0317** -0.0310**
(0.0127) (0.0130) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0126)
gdppc -1.47e-06 -1.03e-05 -9.15e-06 -3.99e-06 -6.26e-06 1.26e-05 1.84e-05
(2.37e-05) (2.64e-05) (2.25e-05) (2.43e-05) (2.40e-05) (2.62e-05) (2.56e-05)
guarantee 0.385*
(0.228)
gdpgrguarantee -0.202**
(0.0855)
gdppcguarantee 6.16e-05
(4.50e-05)
rirguarantee 0.0390
(0.0356)
inatnguarantee 0.00269
(0.0102)
m2fxresguarantee 0.182**
(0.0717)
crgdpguarantee 0.0117**
(0.00549)
Observations 595 595 595 595 595 595 595
No. of countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Banking Instability and Deposit Insurance Coverage
(1) (2)
Variables bbrun binsolv
gdpgr -0.111*** -0.123**
(0.0427) (0.0477)
rir 0.000637 -0.0467**
(0.00644) (0.0214)
inatn -0.000135 -0.0103
(0.000897) (0.00776)
m2fxres 0.0193 -0.00238
(0.0171) (0.0150)
crgdp 0.00432 0.00861**
(0.00396) (0.00409)
xrdepr -0.0244** -0.0272**
(0.00977) (0.0128)
fxcoverd -0.523 0.260
(0.437) (0.479)
intbank 0.450 0.774
(0.486) (0.504)
Observations 541 563
No. of countries 41 44
Standard errors given in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Banking Instability and the Deposit Insurance Legal Environment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables bbrun bbrun binsolv binsolv
gdpgr -0.0738 -0.0660 -0.0893* -0.0755
(0.0450) (0.0466) (0.0537) (0.0543)
rir 0.00561 0.00484 -0.0429 -0.0369
(0.00769) (0.00784) (0.0280) (0.0275)
inatn -0.000658 -0.000619 -0.0146 -0.0104
(0.00109) (0.00110) (0.00985) (0.00778)
m2fxres 0.0240 0.0408* -0.0106 -0.00684
(0.0169) (0.0209) (0.0166) (0.0175)
crgdp 0.00765 0.00771 0.0126** 0.0203**
(0.00501) (0.00883) (0.00631) (0.00878)
xrdepr -0.0277** -0.0338*** -0.0515*** -0.0575***
(0.0108) (0.0118) (0.0159) (0.0160)
gdppc -2.33e-05 -2.38e-05 -1.90e-05 -3.78e-05
(2.52e-05) (2.87e-05) (3.33e-05) (3.22e-05)
interven -0.656 4.168* 0.695 2.620*
(0.720) (2.293) (0.778) (1.422)
leglcancel 0.940** 1.400* 0.314 1.471*
(0.461) (0.831) (0.538) (0.811)
leglmgr 0.265 -0.359 -0.417 -1.337
(0.476) (0.928) (0.526) (0.895)
intervencrgdp -0.0769** -0.0314
(0.0362) (0.0211)
leglcancelcrgdp -0.000608 -0.0123
(0.00942) (0.00901)
leglmgrcrgdp 0.0157 0.0166
(0.0133) (0.0118)
Observations 455 455 465 465
No. of countries 35 35 37 37
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: Banking Instability and the Administration of Deposit Insurance
(1) (2)
Variables bbrun binsolv
gdpgr -0.0996** -0.115**
(0.0443) (0.0487)
rir 0.000684 -0.0595***
(0.00643) (0.0223)
inatn -8.29e-05 -0.0118
(0.000906) (0.00788)
m2fxres 0.0202 -0.000550
(0.0180) (0.0151)
crgdp 0.00256 0.00607
(0.00560) (0.00654)
xrdepr -0.0252** -0.0292**
(0.0101) (0.0131)
gdppc 1.27e-05 2.87e-06
(2.64e-05) (3.36e-05)
admin 0.138 0.119
(0.268) (0.289)
coinsur 0.858 -0.312
(0.747) (0.620)
funding 1.372** -0.732**
(0.669) (0.371)
rskadj 0.106 0.0281
(0.527) (0.594)
membship 0.126 0.254
(0.571) (0.630)
sourcefnd 0.716* 0.780*
(0.433) (0.447)
Observations 529 551
No. of countries 38 41
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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